CJEU Clarifies Appropriate Assessment

Key Contacts: Alice Whittaker – Chairperson | Rachel Minch – Partner | Alison Hardiman – Consultant

However, a number of pertinent questions are left unanswered by the CJEU. Legal uncertainty remains with respect to the precise nature of the AA obligations for strategic plans.

Formally adopted by the Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine, the strategy lacked any statutory basis and does not impose binding legal obligations. Nevertheless, there was a clear intent that FV2030 would be taken into account in downstream plan and project level decision-making.

The Friends of the Irish Environment (FOIE) challenged the adoption of FV2030 in the High Court on several grounds, including an alleged failure to undertake a proper AA for the purposes of Article 6(3). The High Court dismissed this ground on the basis that “no specifically identifiable [European Site is] capable of being addressed by reference to FV2020” and therefore the “AA process is just not practicable or even possible.”

The Court continued, stating that where “impacts on European sites, if any, are not “sufficiently identifiable at [this] stage” an obligation to undertake an AA cannot arise, and the applicant had failed to discharge the burden of proof in this respect.

The first question was whether FV2030 specifically fell within the scope of Article 6(3).

The second question was whether AA of such an abstract plan could possibly satisfy the requirement that, before its adoption, “it is conclusively established that [the plan] will not adversely affect the integrity of any Natura 2000 site in light of its conservation objectives”, as required by Article 6(3).

“123. … It is more difficult to see how this approach could work in relation to the AA of strategic plans under the Habitats Directive. Article 6(3) of that Directive is framed in a way such that the plan or project to be adopted can only be agreed if it is conclusively established that it will not adversely affect the integrity of any Natura 2000 site in light of its conservation objectives. Therefore, if AA is required, the guidance contained in the Commission Notice does not seem consistent with the legal obligation on a national authority not to agree a sectoral plan which encompasses elements which may harm protected habitats or species – and that the absence of such harm must be established to a high level of scientific certainty. This is the case even if it is intended that the actual potential for harm will be more fully assessed at project level.”

  1. Is a high-level strategic policy such as FV2030 capable of constituting or being deemed a “plan or project” within the meaning of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive?
  2. Can a policy such as FV2030 constitute a plan or programme within the meaning of Article 6(3) if it does not contain measures of adequate specificity to allow them to be quantified and assessed and it is not possible to identify any specific Natura 2000 site or sites which might be affected by its implementation so as to enable an assessment to be carried out by reference to the site(s) conservation measures?
  3. Is it sufficient for an AA of such policy to identify generally the environmental risks posed by activities coming within the sector covered by the policy and the effects those activities might have generally on protected habitat types and species in Natura 2000 sites in Ireland without identifying specific risks that might impact upon individually identified sites?

The CJEU has confirmed that the concept of a “plan” under Article 6(3) includes a broad range of coordinated guidelines, measures or actions aimed at “achieving a specific objective” that are not directly connected with or necessary to the management of European Site and likely to have an effect on such a site. The Court held the drafters of the Directive did not consider it necessary to “restrict the scope of that provision to certain formal categories of measures.”

For Article 6(3) to apply to a measure, some of the following criteria must be satisfied:

  • There must be probability or a risk that the plan will have a significant effect on the site concerned.
  • The plan must go beyond the stage of mere preliminary administrative reflection and carries a degree of precision in the planning in question.
  • The assessment required under Article 6(3) should, in principle, be carried out as soon as all the effects which the plan question is likely to have on a protected site are “sufficiently identifiable” (citing Inter-Environnement Wallonie and Bond Beter Leefmilieu Vlaanderen, C‑411/17, EU:C:2019:622, paragraph 143).
  • If national law requires that a measure must be taken into account when adopting subsequent decisions in the matter, such that the measure may have considerable in considerable influence on those decisions, it is to be regarded as a “plan” for the purposes of Article 6(3).

Therefore, documents of “purely indicative value” cannot be classified as a “plan” for the purposes of Article 6(3), but anything that is required to be “taken into account when adopting subsequent decisions in the matter, such that it may have considerable influence on those decisions” will likely be regarded as a plan.

A case-by-case assessment would often be required to determine whether a document is covered by Article 6(3), taking into account, for example “the legal force of the document in question, its degree of precision and the extent to which it may have an influence on subsequent decisions adopted in the matter and, therefore, on the conservation of the sites concerned.”

For FV2030, the CJEU noted that:

  1. No national legislative, administrative or regulatory provision provides for the adoption of FV2030, which is not legally binding.
  2. FV2030 outlines a strategic ‘vision’ for the agri-food sector, sets long term goals and is intended to steer the future development of that sector. However, it does not authorise or limit any activity or establish criteria for downstream decision making.
  3. The content of FV2030 does not make it possible to identify the specific actions that might affect a particular European Site.

As the CJEU found that FV2030 was not a “plan” for the purposes of Article 6(3), it did not consider the Court of Appeal’s third question, which queried the level of assessment that is required for a strategic plan in light of the European Commission’s Guidance on Article 6(3).

This is regrettable. Numerous plans are produced annually in Ireland that may fulfil some or all of the criteria identified by the CJEU in paragraphs 23 – 27 of its judgment, and summarised above, but for which it is nevertheless not possible to undertake an AA to the level of certainty specified by case law on Article 6(3).

Indeed, the CJEU suggested that even if FV2030 constituted a “plan” within those criteria, an AA would not have been practicable possible:

“32      Thus, it appears that, in view of those characteristics of FV2030, any assessment of its environmental implications could only be general and abstract in nature, and it would not be possible to identify with the requisite precision the implications of its implementation for one or more protected sites.”

Further compounding this uncertainty, it is not clear what the CJEU meant when it stated, at paragraph 26 of its judgment, that an AA should “in principle, be carried out as soon as all the effects which the plan in question is likely to have on a protected site are sufficiently identifiable”.

The concept of “sufficient identifiability” is drawn from Case C‑411/17 (cited above), which addressed the stage at which an AA was required in the context of legislation extending the operating life of two nuclear power plants. The CJEU in that case ruled that an AA must be conducted before agreement to adopt a plan is given but that “if national law provides for a number of steps in the consent procedure, the assessment under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, should, in principle, be carried out as soon as the effects which the project in question is likely to have on a protected site are sufficiently identifiable.” The CJEU continued:

“144. … the fact that subsequent acts must be adopted in order to proceed with that project, specifically a new specific consent for production of electricity for industrial purposes at one of the two power stations in question, does not justify the failure to conduct an appropriate assessment of those effects before the adoption of that legislation. “

In that case, the obligation to undertake an AA once effects are sufficiently identifiable meant at the earliest possible stage, even if a plan is dependent on other implementing measures.

However, what is not clear is how, or at what stage, an AA must be carried out in respect of a high-level, strategic plan that falls within the scope of Article 6(3) and is likely to have a significant effect on a European Site, but where the precise nature and extent of those effects are not sufficiently identifiable at the plan-making stage. 

The test for AA Screening turns on the likelihood that a plan or project may undermine the conservation objectives of a European Site. Given that “likelihood” of adverse effects arises when, having regard to the precautionary principle, it cannot be ruled out on the basis of the best scientific knowledge in the field, that such effects might occur, an inability to sufficiently identify those effects is unlikely to constitute a sound basis for screening out the need for AA.

How then does the concept of “sufficient identifiability” factor into the two-stage test for AA under Article 6(3)? Does it represent a third limb of the test to ensure the workability of that provision where adverse effects cannot be ruled out, but cannot with any certainty be sufficiently identified and assessed?

How does this concept interact with the High Court’s finding that there must be “specifically identifiable” European Sites capable of being address or affected by reference to a plan?

Alternatively, does “sufficient identifiability” speak to the content of the assessment required of strategic plans, and thereby align with the Commission Guidance that acknowledges “possible limitations and constraints and suitable approaches that can be used to overcome the difficulties and uncertainties linked with a lack of detailed information or insufficient definition of all the elements, components and actions of the plan.”

Unhelpfully, the CJEU simply concluded in its “Food Vision” ruling that:

This article was written with the assistance of Associate, Lee Boorman.