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The doctrines of maintenance and champerty continue to generally preclude the funding of litigation in Ireland by third parties. While jurisdictions such as the UK and US have embraced third-party litigation funding as a tool to enhance access to justice, Irish courts have consistently reaffirmed the general prohibition. The superior courts in Ireland have considered the doctrines of maintenance and champerty in a number of cases in recent years and, to date, have continued to affirm the rules.
Philip Lee LLP has written a number of articles on this topic which can be found below. In this article we set out an update on some recent decisions on the topic.
Issues relating to Champerty and Maintenance were examined by the High Court in the case of Campbell v O’Doherty [2025] IEHC 223 in the context of crowdfunding being utilised to fund litigation. In March of this year, we analysed recent developments in this area including the Campbell case in our article on Third-Party Litigation Funding in Ireland.
In recent weeks, the courts have delivered two significant judgments, providing further clarity on the current position in Ireland with respect to third-party litigation funding. The Supreme Court in Howley v McClean; Howley v Howard [2026] IESC 34, clarified the legality of “no foal, no fee” arrangements and “conditional uplift” fees. In the case of QPQ Limited v Schute [2026] IEHC 463, the High Court considered the circumstances in which a party may be required to reveal its litigation funding arrangements.
Howley v McClean; Howley v Howard [2026] IESC 34
It was once again emphasised by the Supreme Court in this case that in applying the law relating to maintenance and champerty, constitutional principles, in particular the right of access to the courts, must be considered. Hogan J emphasised in his judgment that “a practice which has become embedded in the administration of justice, and which operates to facilitate such access, should not be declared unlawful save on compelling grounds.”
The background to this case related to a tax debt recovery action by the Revenue Commissioners. The fee agreement between the Revenue Commissioners and its panel of solicitors included a conditional uplift based on the amount actually recovered, and a ‘no foal, no fee’ arrangement whereby the fee payable to the firms was dependent on whether the Revenue Commissioners actually recovered sums against the taxpayer.
Conditional uplift fees
The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to s.149(1)(a) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, conditional uplift fee arrangements were lawful and do not fall foul of champerty and maintenance rules.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that this type of arrangement would have offended the rules of maintenance and champerty in the past but confirmed that the common law rule has “in this respect only been supplanted by the exceptions provided for in s. 149(1)(a) [of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015], so far as debt collection cases of this kind are concerned”.
‘No Foal, No Fee’ arrangements
The Supreme Court also took this opportunity to provide clarity in respect of the law in Ireland regarding ‘no foal, no fee’ arrangements. It was confirmed that such arrangements are lawful in this jurisdiction, and the court cited cases such as McHugh v Keane (Unreported, High Court, 16 December 1994) and Synott v Adekoya [2010] IEHC 26 as authorities for the lawfulness of such arrangements.
Champerty as a defence
Finally, the Supreme Court confirmed that the essential purpose of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty is to maintain the integrity of the administration of justice, and that to prevent a champertous agreement from being raised as a valid defence to proceedings would undermine this essential purpose. In other words, the Supreme Court confirmed that the remedies of a litigant facing a champertous or maintenance arrangement are not limited to a separate action in tort for damages, but act as a full defence to the claim. It said that obliging defendants to defend champertous proceedings or proceedings which had been improperly maintained would “effectively undermine” the rules on champerty and maintenance.
QPQ Limited v Schute [2026] IEHC 463
In this case, the High Court considered the circumstances in which a party may be required to disclose its litigation funding arrangements. The application for disclosure was brought by the defendant on foot of WhatsApp messages which it had obtained through discovery made by the plaintiff in the proceedings. The defendant argued that these messages demonstrated that a third party had provided funding for the litigation and that additional funding may become available.
The court confirmed that, as held by the Supreme Court in Kirwan v Connors [2025] IESC 21, the court enjoys an inherent jurisdiction to make any order designed to ensure that the administration of justice operates in an efficient and effective manner. It was held that this jurisdiction included the power to make a disclosure order, irrespective of how the existence of the funding arrangement had come to the attention of the court.
Ultimately, the court rejected arguments that the order should be refused on grounds of delay or a failure to seek security for costs, and the plaintiff was ordered to disclose the source and details of its funding to the defendant and the court.
What These Decisions Mean
The Supreme Court in Howley has provided helpful clarity on the lawfulness of certain solicitor fee arrangements and has confirmed that maintenance and champerty can be raised as a valid defence to proceedings.
In QPQ, the High Court made clear that litigants may be required to disclose their funding arrangements where there is a credible evidential basis for believing that the proceedings may be supported by unlawful third-party funding.
These recent decisions refine the operation of the rules on maintenance and champerty in specific contexts but do not represent a departure from the long-established Irish position that third-party litigation funding remains generally prohibited save in limited and recognised circumstances.
